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CHAPTER 21 
SCANDINAVIA AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONALISM 
RECONSIDERED 
 
Caroline Howard Grøn and Anders Wivel 
 
Introduction: Two tales of Scandinavia in international society 
The Nordic countries are renowned for their activism when it comes to strengthening international 
society (Browning 2007; Ingebritsen 2002).1 They have actively promoted causes such as peaceful 
conflict resolution, human rights, combating poverty, global inequality and environmental 
degradation, and they have played an active role in strengthening and developing organizations such 
as the United Nations at the global level and the Council of Europe at the European level. In their 
own ‘quiet corner’ of Europe (cf. Archer 2005: 398), the Nordic countries have nurtured an 
ideologically driven but functionally implemented ‘cob-web integration’ taking its point of 
departure in the values of 19th century Scandinavism and the Scandinavian welfare states but 
pursuing cooperation and with a focus on ‘low politics’ and cultural and educational exchange.2 At 
  
the same time, intra-Nordic cooperation has served as a platform for extra-Nordic influence, and the 
Nordic countries have been widely recognized for their particular way of doing politics 
domestically and internationally and for their international contribution. They continuously top 
international rankings such as the Global Peace Index and the Good Country Index. And they are 
recognized by the world’s only superpower for making the world ‘more secure’ and ‘more 
prosperous’, as President Obama declared in his welcome to the five Nordic prime ministers for a 
White House meeting and state dinner in May 2016 (Harris 2016).3 In short, the Nordics are at the 
same time doing good and doing well with regard to international society in general. 
The Scandinavian approach to EU integration seems to provide a marked contrast to this overall 
picture. Historically, the Scandinavian approach to EU integration is reluctant and self-serving 
(Miljan 1977; Wallace 1999). As of 2016, two of the Nordics remain outside of the EU (Norway 
and Iceland), albeit with extensive cooperative arrangements via-à-vis the EU; two countries are 
members but with opt-outs (Denmark and Sweden); and the last one, Finland, was the teacher’s pet 
in the EU classroom until the financial crisis from 2008 and the migration crisis from 2015. Since 
then, the Finns have increasingly moved away from the EU mainstream. In short, according to this 
tale, the Nordic countries are neither homogenous nor consistent with respect to EU integration. 
This will be demonstrated in the following. 
We argue that the contrast between Scandinavian behaviour in the EU and in other contexts is less 
marked than it might initially appear. Scandinavian EU policies are characterized by a ‘yes, but…’ 
approach, guarding their exceptionalism but taking advantage of any opportunities that may arise to 
maximize their interests (Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel 2015a: 244). Furthermore, the self-serving 
interventions of Nordic states in EU politics are typically at the same time attempts at protecting 
and/or spreading the core values of the Scandinavian welfare state. From this starting point, we 
  
discuss the origin(s) and content(s) of the Scandinavian approach(es) to EU integration. 
Scandinavia has been described as ‘the other European community’ (Turner and Nordquist 1982), 
and the Nordic countries share a number of political, societal and cultural characteristics, which 
lead actors both within and beyond these countries to consider them a block within the EU or 
perhaps even a community (Archer 2005: 397; Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel 2015b: 1). We explore 
whether these similarities amount to a Scandinavian model for EU integration; and to the extent this 
is the case, then what characterizes this model. The chapter proceeds in five steps. First, we briefly 
identify the historical origins of Scandinavian engagement with the EU followed by two sections 
exploring different ways of understanding the relationships between the Nordics: how they relate to 
the EU in terms of specific policies and how they engage with EU institutions. The fourth section 
discusses Nordic grand strategies in the EU and the role of Scandinavia in these strategies. Finally, 
we conclude by summing up the main characteristics of the Nordic model(s) in EU integration. 
 
From ‘the other European community’ to ‘expert and experienced bridge-builders’?  
Two buzzwords are typically bandied about when characterizing Nordic–European relations with 
respect to European integration. The Scandinavians are ‘reluctant Europeans’ (Miljan 1977) and 
they nurture ‘the other European community’ (Turner and Nordquist 1982); that is, intra-Nordic 
cooperation. However, these characterizations are only true with significant qualifications. 
Scandinavian reluctance towards European integration is qualified by the very high degree of 
compliance with EU legislation and regulation by Nordic EU and EEA member states and by a 
relatively high degree of electoral support towards membership. Also, even the two Nordic non-
members participate fully in EU market integration and in EU’s research cooperation (as far as 
Norway is concerned) (with the notable exceptions of the agricultural and fishery sectors). Thus, 
  
even though two Nordic countries remain outside of the EU and two of the three members have 
opted out of parts of the integration process, all of the Nordics are highly involved in the European 
integration processes. 
The Scandinavians are more accurately described as European latecomers, although even this 
characterization requires unpacking. When the EU was established in 1957 with the Treaty of 
Rome, there were no Nordic participants. Denmark first joined in 1973, and any real debate in 
Sweden and Finland on joining only surfaced after the end of the Cold War as formal membership 
of the European integration project was viewed as potentially undermining their neutral Cold War 
posturing. As early as 1947, however, Denmark displayed interest in plans to create a European 
Customs Union, and Denmark considered joining the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1952–53 (ECSC). From the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, 
strong interest groups (particularly from agriculture) and government officials considered 
membership a real option. According to these actors, it was an option with more benefits than the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) of which Denmark, Norway and Sweden were founding 
members in 1960 (Olesen 1995: 10). Like Denmark, Norway and Iceland were founding NATO 
members in 1949 and as such positioned squarely in the Western camp during the Cold War. Rather 
than a lead-in to European integration, however, ‘[t]heir geopolitical location on the margin of 
Europe and their associated Atlanticism have led to and compensated for their unwillingness to 
participate fully in the European project’ (Thorhallsson 2015: 46). 
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Norway might otherwise have become a member as early as 1963. In 1962, Norway applied for 
membership together with Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, but the negotiations ended 
with a French veto against British membership. The Norwegian decision to apply was a reaction to 
the applications from Denmark and in particular the UK, as membership had previously been a non-
issue (Archer and Sogner 1998: 26–27). In 1967, Norway reapplied together with the UK, Denmark 
and Ireland, and even though the negotiations were suspended due to another French veto, they 
resumed in 1970 and were concluded in 1972. In contrast to the Danish electorate who supported 
membership with a majority of 63.3%, however, the Norwegian electorate rejected membership by 
53.3%. After the Cold War, Norway re-applied for membership in 1992, once again in a Nordic 
context, with three Cold War-neutral Western European countries Sweden, Finland and Austria. 
The EU succession negotiations ended successfully in 1994, but membership was once again 
rejected by the electorate in a referendum; this time by 52.2%. Sweden joined with 52.3% in favour, 
Finland with 56.9%. Iceland, an EEA member since 1994 and Schengen member since 2001, first 
applied for EU membership following the financial crisis in 2008 and the ensuing collapse of the 
Icelandic economy, which left Iceland ‘trapped within the European Economic Area without having 
the shelter inherent in membership of the European Union’ (Thorhallsson 2016: 54). Their bid was 
officially retracted in 2015, however, as the Icelandic economy rebounded.4 
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If we measure the European reluctance of the Nordic countries in terms of their engagement in ‘the 
other [Scandinavian] European community’, Nordic cooperation does not come out as the 
  
unequivocal winner. Negotiations on a Scandinavian Defence Union in 1947–48 failed as the US 
refused to back the plans, and Denmark and Norway subsequently opted for NATO membership. 
Plans for a Nordic Economic Community (NORDEK) – an alternative to European integration – 
failed in 1968–70 when Finland withdrew its support and Denmark subsequently joined the EU. 
The history of Nordic cooperation is littered with grand schemes that never materialized. In that 
sense, the Nordics are not just reluctant Europeans, but even more reluctant Scandinavians.5 At the 
same time, this ‘narrative of failure’ is complemented by a ‘narrative of success’ emphasizing the 
Nordic security community and the numerous low-key, low-politics examples of cooperation 
between private, public and third-sector actors as well as many examples of policy learning (Strang 
2016: 3–9). 
More accurately, we can characterize the Nordic countries as a group of highly and increasingly 
Europeanized and globalized states that never subscribed to the European idea but have increasingly 
found it in their national interest to advocate an integrated but differentiated Europe, acting 
themselves as ‘expert and experienced bridge-builders’ (Miles 2015: 29). Taking in this role, they 
negotiate the connections between their Nordic welfare states, their geopolitical interests vis-à-vis 
the US, Russia and the large EU member states, and seek to reconcile the politics of choice in their 
Nordic models with the politics of necessity in relations with Europe and the rest of the world. 
 
Scandinavia and EU policy areas: Divided on sovereignty, 
united on the welfare state 
The EU has been described as an Unidentified Political Object or sui generis (e.g. Caporaso et al. 
1997) compared to other types of state cooperation. However, the EU increasingly makes policy in 
  
areas affecting the domestic constitution of member state societies as well as the everyday lives of 
the citizens in these societies.6 As small, trade-dependent nations, all of the Nordics participate in 
the common market: Sweden, Finland and Denmark, as a consequence of their EU membership, 
and Norway and Iceland, as a consequence of their membership of the European Economic Area 
(EEA), which leaves them inside the market but without formal channels for influencing the EU 
legislation that determines the rules of play. Thus, it is of no surprise that Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland typically support the internal market and promote liberalization in EU negotiations (Jensen 
and Nedergaard 2015). 
Commitment to free trade also serves as part of the material and ideational underpinning of the 
Scandinavian welfare states. Using free trade as a tool for economic growth since the 19th century, it 
was argued that ‘protectionism would only stifle economic growth and put the burdens on those 
who were the least able to bear them, namely the poor’ (Schouenborg 2013: 99). Similarly, the 
Nordics find strong commonalities in issues relating directly to the construction of their welfare 
states. This pertains to labour market policies, such as minimum wages, which are traditionally the 
result of negotiations between employers’ organizations, trade unions and government 
representatives rather than being negotiated by parliament and decided by law in the Nordic 
countries. Thus, the Nordic countries share a common interest in curbing legislation that limits the 
room for national collective bargaining. 
Similarly, the free movement of labour has challenged both the (high) negotiated wage levels 
among Nordic workers (Jensen 2015) as well as the universal Scandinavian welfare models, 
particularly in relation to the question of welfare benefits. Whereas Finland and Denmark have 
defended their national models most proactively in this area (Kuisma and Nygård 2015: 168), all of 
the Nordic countries seek to maintain a delicate balance between keeping the core aspects of the 
  
welfare state while at the same time reforming it and adapting it in line with European and global 
developments. Similarly, Denmark and Sweden in particular have been strong defenders of a 
‘green’ agenda in the EU, promoting stronger environmental regulation and an active climate policy 
(cf. Liefferink and Andersen 1998; Wivel 2009; see also Jens Hoff’s contribution to this volume). 
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There are differences as well. As pointed out above, two Nordic EU member states have opt-outs, 
whereas the two Nordic countries outside of the EU participate in selected aspects of EU 
integration, albeit without any formal channels of influence on EU decision-making. Denmark has 
four opt-outs, three of which still have policy relevance: Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and defence cooperation. Similarly, Sweden has an opt-out 
regarding the EMU. In Justice and Home Affairs, despite its non-membership, Norway has 
gradually moved closer to the EU core as a consequence of Schengen participation and subsequent 
efforts to curb cross-border crime and illegal immigration (Adler-Nissen 2015: 100). 
 
In contrast, Iceland, the other Nordic non-member, has not had the same incentives to JHA 
integration due to its geographical location in the North Atlantic Ocean, which practically isolates it 
from most of the adverse consequences of de facto abolishment of physical borders in the Schengen 
area. Sweden and Finland both participate extensively in JHA. Sweden even used the areas for 
pushing a classical Scandinavian agenda with the Stockholm Programme of 2009, which provided a 
framework for policy responses regarding development cooperation and social, educational, 
  
employment and health issues with a particular focus on gender equality and human trafficking 
(European Union 2009). Conversely, Denmark is formally bound by an opt-out and further limited 
by the salience of the question of immigration in Danish domestic politics. The country has 
remained reluctant regarding JHA participation and confirmed the continuation of the formal opt-
out in a referendum on 3 December 2015, despite warnings from senior police officers that this 
would most likely have repercussions for continued Danish participation in Europol. 
This overall image of ‘misty boundaries’ between member and non-member states is repeated with 
respect to EU defence cooperation.7 Sweden and Finland participate fully in the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP), and Norway and Iceland have been participating in EU military 
operations. Denmark has a formal opt-out from defence cooperation, which prohibits the country 
from participating in EU military missions as well as the development and acquisition of military 
capabilities in the context of the EU. With the exception of Finland, however, the EU plays a 
marginal role in the defence policies of the Nordic countries, with NATO and the UN traditionally 
having a much stronger impact on official strategy and public discourse (Wivel and Marcussen 
2015). One might get the impression that Denmark is the most reluctant European in the Nordic 
family. Turning to the EMU, however, it becomes clear that Sweden joins the team of sceptics on 
this issue. Whereas Finland joined the Euro due to geopolitical concerns over Russia, Sweden 
stayed outside, with an option to join, whereas Denmark obtained a politically driven opt-out, 
choosing to peg its currency to the Euro (Korkman 2015). 
Whereas these policy areas all convey an image of ‘misty boundaries’ between Nordic EU member 
states and EU non-member states, the primary sector, agriculture and fishery, has served as a de 
facto ‘selector’ on EU membership in Scandinavia. In Norway and Iceland, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) are ‘seen to pose grave threats to 
  
the primary sectors. The fisheries sector is closely associated with the way of life in both of these 
states, but it is also by far the most important economic sector in Iceland’ (Thorhallsson 2015: 47). 
Similarly, agricultural policy has been an issue in the two countries’ accession negotiations (Skinner 
2010). In contrast, Denmark and Sweden are both in favour of reforming the CAP in a more 
market-based direction (Nedergaard and Jensen 2015: 139). Finland, on the other hand, has 
defended the CAP (Kola 2008); a position matching the structure of the Finnish agricultural sector 
and serving its interests. As with the EMU, however, geopolitics also play a more direct role in 
Finnish EU policy than in the other Nordics, leaving the most eastern Nordic country with a more 
restricted action space when it comes to protesting EU policies and opting out of policy areas. 
In sum, the Nordics remain united in defence of the core aspects of the Scandinavian welfare state, 
including core policies on health and the labour market as well as a protective stance towards the 
environment and human rights, and they are sceptical but divided over policies pertaining more 
broadly to sovereignty-related issues. Two factors seem to have played a particularly important role 
when it comes to opting in and out of policy areas as well as the EU. First, geopolitics, leaving 
Finland with a narrower action space than the other Nordics, due to its proximity to Russia 
combined with its lack of alliance membership, and leaving Norway and Iceland on the Atlantic 
coast at the margin of Europe, isolated from at least some of the adverse consequences of increasing 
interdependence driving the European integration project from its outset. Second, primary sector 
policies, in particular the CFP, viewed as threatening the way of life in Norway, Iceland, Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands, and the economic interests of the latter three of these nations (Thorhallsson 
2015: 47) (see also the Andersen and Busk Larsen contribution to this volume). 
 
The Nordic countries and EU institutions 
  
The most fundamental differences in Scandinavian institutional strategies in the EU pertain to the 
fact that Norway and Iceland are not EU member states and, therefore, not embedded in its 
institutional structure. Norway and Iceland do not negotiate in the Council of Ministers, they do not 
have a commissioner amongst the College of Commissioners, and they have no members of the 
European Parliament. On this background, they are left to pursue EU institutions more like a lobby 
group than a member state (cf. Thorhallsson 2000). However, there are important differences in 
terms of how many resources each of the countries allocates to lobbying the EU; Norway has a 
substantial presence in Brussels, matching more or less the presence of a country such as Denmark,8 
whereas the Icelandic presence is much more limited.9 
There are also notable differences between the three Nordic EU member states. Whereas Denmark 
is illustrative of a classical small state approach, working within the political parameters set by the 
great powers, Sweden acts more like a middle power, refusing to accept small-state status to the 
same extent as Denmark. Swedish officials and politicians therefore tend to politicize, for example 
vis-à-vis the Commission bringing their own independent ideas and visions to the negotiation table, 
even at the risk of conflict and confrontation, whereas Danish officials point out the importance of 
keeping things technical, not causing too much trouble and being seen as a constructive player 
(Grøn 2015). Similarly, there are institutional differences when it comes to the involvement of 
national parliaments in EU policy. Since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, it has been an official EU 
aim to increase the involvement of national parliaments in policy-making. While this plays into 
traditional Nordic ideals of broad public involvement in societal developments dating back to 19th 
century Scandinavism and beyond, there are marked differences in the implementation of this aim 
between the Nordic EU member states, with Denmark and Finland serving as extreme examples of 
each end of a continuum. Whereas the Danish Folketing has been an active and constructive player 
in the process, going so far as to assume the role as coordinator for other parliaments, the Finns 
  
have been very reluctant to take on the role as an independent actor at the EU level (Cooper 2015: 
113). This is curious considering that the Finnish parliamentary practice for how to handle EU 
affairs is strongly inspired by the European Affairs Committee in the Danish Parliament. 
Despite these differences on institutional access and policy substance, there are strong similarities 
among the Nordic countries following from their relatively similar institutional traditions. Over the 
past decade, small EU member states have been challenged by the weakening of the European 
Commission, which was traditionally the ‘best friend’ of the small states due to its role as the 
impartial caretaker of the common interest and a source of information and technical expertise 
(Bunse, Magnette and Nicolaïdis 2005; Geurts 1998). Conversely, the European Council and the 
Parliament have gained influence as a result of post-Lisbon Treaty decision-making rules, and 
informal great power ‘directorates’ have gained legitimacy and influence, thereby increasing the 
importance of informal negotiations outside of official forums and creating a platform for big 
member state influence (Grøn and Wivel 2011). 
However, the relatively resourceful, merit-based and well-functioning civil services of all of the 
Nordic countries put them in a privileged position vis-à-vis other small states to take advantage of 
this development (cf. Haverland and Lifferink 2012 on lobby resources). Thus, the Nordics have 
proven relatively successful in informal negotiations, and Finland and Denmark are both in the top 
five of the most active countries in lobbying EU institutions, whereas Sweden is in eighth spot 
(Panke 2011: 132). When it comes to developing high quality position papers in time for Council 
negotiations, Sweden, Denmark and Finland are all among the highest ranking member states 
(Panke 2010). 
When measuring the success of member states in changing the texts of European directives and 
regulations in accordance with their national positions, the Nordic member states also rank highly, 
  
Sweden taking second (after the UK) and Finland (sixth) and Denmark (eighth) also in the top ten 
(Panke 2016: 63–64). Moreover, Nordic member states have successfully established a forerunner 
reputation and technical expertise within a number of issue areas, including conflict prevention and 
civil crisis management, allowing them to play a role as norm entrepreneurs influencing decision-
makers in the Commission and the European Parliament (Arter 2000; Björkdahl 2008; Jakobsen 
2009). 
At the same time, the Nordic countries face two challenges to institutional influence. First, the three 
Nordic EU member states are facing or have faced issues of recruitment of own nationals to the EU 
institutions, most prominently the recruitment of civil servants to the European Commission (Grøn 
2015; Heeger 2015). In recent years, the Danish government has continuously encouraged more 
people to pursue a career in the EU.10 Second, the Nordic countries like playing by the rules, which 
can be both an advantage and a disadvantage in a political system that is not always very akin to 
how the Nordic countries work (Grøn 2015; see e.g. the classical discussion by Coombes 1970; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 67ff). While playing by the rules has been instrumental in creating a 
Nordic brand as trustworthy partners willing and able to deliver on their promises, the increasing 
importance of informal forums means that Nordic civil servants must navigate in a negotiation 
space with opaque or non-existent rules. The Nordics are likely to do so with varying degrees of 
success, Sweden and Denmark representing the extremes. Swedish negotiations typically take their 
point of departure in a top-down model with a policy position clearly defined from Stockholm and 
with limited action space for negotiators on the ground, whereas Denmark typically works with 
broader mandates allowing for greater flexibility in negotiations and the negotiator enjoys greater 
autonomy. 
 
  
Nordic strategies in the EU 
Which strategies do the Nordic countries employ to maximize influence in the EU? And what role 
does Scandinavia play in these strategies? One such strategy is the actor strategy. As illustrated 
above, the Nordic countries have common policy interests on a number of material and ideational 
issues as well as common institutional traits. These commonalities allow the Nordics to appear as a 
unified actor in relation to selected issues on the European stage, such as the drive for increased 
transparency in EU institutions and an EU strategy for the Baltic region. With two Nordic states 
outside of the EU there are also clear limitations to this approach, however, leaving Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland to act within the formal EU channels. A second limitation marking this 
strategy is the fact that, even as a bloc, the three Nordic countries are not of a size to make them 
matter in the Council of Ministers. While they may be successful in agenda-setting issues, other 
allies are necessary if agenda-setting is to be converted into legislation. 
 
When it comes to negotiations in the Council of Ministers, the Nordic cooperation may rather be 
seen as an arena. Nordic cooperation within the EU is often a matter of sharing information and 
informally testing arguments rather than building coalitions and agreeing on detailed policy 
positions. Therefore, they have institutionalized meeting forums where they can pool and share 
information and expertise and test their arguments (Rûse 2015: 64). The Nordic Council of 
Ministers provides an institutional setting emphasizing Nordic cooperation and has increasingly 
focused on the EU in recent years (Nordic Council of Ministers 2015: 33), although usually as a 
forum for debate rather than a platform for coalition-building (Rûse 2015). 
  
Finally, Nordic cooperation is occasionally little more than an appendix to how the Nordic countries 
deal with EU policies. As argued above, there are a number of issues where the Nordics clearly do 
not have common interests, such as agricultural policy. Furthermore, the fact that two of them are 
outside the EU possibly makes it less compelling for the insiders to coordinate with them. While the 
rhetorical support for Nordic cooperation is strong and the Nordic EU members do coordinate (Rûse 
2015), there is a mismatch between how the Nordic countries traditionally have been presented as a 
community and how they deal with EU politics on a daily basis. Hence, the Nordic cooperation may 
be more of a toast on special occasions than a central policy tool for ensuring national interest. 
Nordic relations with the EU are increasingly normalized in the sense that a particular Nordic 
position or Nordic bloc has become less discernible as the combined effects of globalization and 
Europeanization have led Nordic decision-makers to amend what was the Social Democratic 
Scandinavian welfare state to approximate societal models in the rest of Europe (Brandal and 
Bratberg 2016; Grøn, Nedergaard and Wivel 2015a: 245–250). Consequently, there may be fewer 
and fewer functional arguments in favour of a particular role for Nordic cooperation. 
 
Conclusions 
The Nordic approach to the EU is most accurately described as pragmatic and functionalist. The 
Nordic countries have pursued their national interests pragmatically without European or Nordic 
bindings. Rather than a Nordic alliance on EU politics, there is more a Nordic cluster exchanging 
information and being comparatively effective and rule-abiding when engaging in negotiations and 
implementation. Pragmatic functionalism takes place in the context of the Scandinavian welfare 
state, which at the same time serves as a platform for action, as in conflict prevention and 
environmental protection and other areas concomitant with the fundamental values of the welfare 
  
state, and as a protective shield for the Scandinavian welfare state. Thus, Scandinavians 
pragmatically opt in and out of policies, creating a map of ‘misty boundaries’ between the three 
Nordic members of the EU and the two non-members. The Nordics all engage actively with the EU, 
but at the same time they all maintain firm bastions against EU integration, particularly in relation 
to their welfare states. The Nordic positions in Europe are basically conditioned by attempts at 
securing the survival of how the Nordic societies have been organized in policies where ‘value’ and 
‘interest’ are difficult to disentangle. Thus, looking across policy areas, we find that national 
positions on EU policies largely reflect domestic interests, be they material (e.g. dealing with 
fisheries) or more ideological in nature (e.g. JHA opt-outs). 
 
Does this make Scandinavians reluctant Europeans? Not any more than they are reluctant Nordics 
or even reluctant globalizers. Rather than the two distinct tales of Scandinavia in international 
society told in the introduction of this chapter, Nordic policies towards the EU seem to be a subset 
of a more general Nordic approach to politics. Thus, just as there are ‘misty boundaries’ between 
Nordic members and non-members of the EU, there are also ‘misty boundaries’ between Nordic EU 
policy and global policy. The ‘Nordic international society’ values reflect those of the welfare state 
(cf. Schouenborg 2013), and they are typically pursued with the same pragmatism. Perhaps not 
surprisingly in this context, the EU has subsumed the Nordic bloc in international relations since the 
end of the Cold War (Laatikainen 2003). In that sense, Scandinavia in the EU may not be as much 
of an outlier in Nordic politics as it is a magnifying glass allowing us to see some of the aspects of 
Scandinavian international politics more clearly, as they are exposed by European developments 
and the Nordic responses to these developments. 
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